Veton Surroi

1.
On Monday, incidents in the city of Mitrovica increased pressure on the new country’s government in administering Kosovo.

Serbian leaders in the northern part of Mitrovica tested the international community’s determination at administrating the entire territory of Kosovo according to the “coordinated declaration of independence”. The results of this instigation, albeit in their infancy, are as follows.

After EU, UNMIK left the northern part of Mitrovica as well and KFOR remains the only international body in that part of town. Serbian leaders in the northern part of Mitrovica, clearly under the direction of Belgrade’s security circles, managed to illegitimize any civic international presence in the north. The Serbian “effort” against KFOR is a sign of worsening hostility between NATO peacekeeping troops and Serbian “civilians”, who showed impressive military power by keeping all of the northern part of Mitrovica under sniper control.

From a strategic viewpoint, I do not think Belgrade or Serbian leaders of the northern part believe that the current situation will remain unchanged. Their last effort was more of an offensive, tactical maneuver that drove away the already weak UNMIK administration from the north, so that negotiations will now concentrate only on allowing the return of UNMIK presence but not EU’s settlement in that part of town.

Even though it was not mentioned anywhere, Monday’s raid was lead by EULEX and the EU-USA international presence held by ICR. Even if the situation returns to what it was before, which will itself prove hard to do, it will go back to the same stage it was for the last 9 years, thus, the “soft partition” of Kosova.


2.
Monday’s events are not out of general context, and as such are not a surprise. In Serbia, the consensus between all political parties, with the exception of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Cedomir Jovanovic, is to go for a “soft partition” of Kosovo, attempting to create a “frozen conflict”.

Furthermore, with Kostunica’s government collapse and the beginning of May 11 elections, Kosovo will become ground to show each party’s (with the said exception) “patriotism”.

The Serbian electoral campaign will not ignore Kosovo because the right moment to execute Operation “Frozen Conflict” was decided to be during the transitioning of competencies from UNMIK to the Republic of Kosovo and the EU mission, during the 120-days that were part of the Ahtisaari Package. Within these 120 days, it is expected that Kosovo builds its own constitutional-judicial system based on the Finnish president’s recommendations and then take upon itself the governmental competencies from UNMIK, minus the rule of law that would remain as EULEX’s responsibility.

If things continue unfolding as they are now, there is a good chance that this plan will fail. With Belgrade’s resistance, the “Ahtisaari” Package will remain un-executable in the parts of Kosovo that depend on Kosovo-Serbia cooperation regarding Kosovo Serbs’ rights. Kosovo’s institutions will then have to carry out all obligations outlined in the Package, but not the benefits of a fully functional country. In layman’s terms, this means that Kosovo will have to create municipalities inhabited by mostly the Serbian ethnicity, but that those municipalities will not function under the Kosovar judicial system.

Belgrade’s goal is to prove that Ahtisaari Package is applicable to Kosovar Albanians but not Kosovar Serbs. And in a relatively short amount of time, Prishtina will understand what is happening and raise public, as well as institutional, awareness regarding their obligations to enforcing the recommendations that conditioned Kosovo’s independence.
 
3.
The last piece of the UNMIK-Kosovo-EU transition is left hanging. Belgrade’s political stance, with Russia’s full support, has caused the international effort to fight on two separate fronts: EU supervising Kosovo’s institutions and UNMIK allowing parallel Serbian institutions within Kosovo.

United Nation’s concern regarding its retreat from Kosovo within the anticipated date could cause not only two parallel existences of the international bodies but also a continuing deterioration of coordination between the said bodies, which will further weaken Kosovo’s government.

Even now, there is growing awareness within a part of the United Nations that talks should be held between UN and EU to explore ways of accommodating the last part of the transition. And if this gives room for negotiations, Serbia and Russia will initiate them. Serbia’s Foreign Minister, Jeremic, sometime ago offered the Serbia’s approval for EULEX to settle in Kosovo, provided that it is done under the UN Resolution. This could open a backdoor to renewed Kosovo negotiations at the UN.

4.
The following days will determine the events of the next couple of years. One of the options, which will be reiterated in diplomatic circuits, as well as public opinion, is that Kosovo was divided all this time and it still managed to function well enough to declare its independence, and it can continue the same even without north’s integration into the Kosovo government. I think it would be wrong to tolerate the current situation for a number of reasons.

First, the current situation will destabilize the political arena in Serbia, and even worse in Kosovo, which will be greatly affected by the “soft partition” as an issue that wears down the already weak politics of a nation facing the incomparable challenge of building a country.

Second, the current situation completely unsettles government functions. For a month now, the northern border customs does not function. This turns the northern part of Mitrovica into a thriving environment for contraband, secured by its forces (the ever-powerful organized crime), while Kosovo’s institutions never see any income.

Third, public services, such as water supply, railways, phone lines, etc., can be disrupted

And last but not least, actual separation of Kosovo, with Monday’s events in Mitrovica, will negatively affect international recognition of the Republic of Kosovo by Third-World countries that, based on biased assessments that might be presented at the UN, will decide to wait until Kosovo’s situation is cleared up.

Monday’s intense situation in Mitrovica could be a positive indicator in the direction that Kosovo is headed towards in the coming months of the transition, which should complete before the beginning of summer. 

Veton Surroi is publisher of Kosovo daily Koha Ditore and participant in the Ahtisaari mediated Kosovo-Serbia status talks. From Albanian: Ilir Pruthi.    

Comments (2)

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edon said:

	... I agree, Veton for FM. We need young diplomat generation and I think he fits very well.
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March 21, 2008
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rosebud said:

... One thing is clear: Russia is using Serbia which on the other hand is using K-Serbs. One might argue that Kosovars are also being used by US and their allies. Well of course they are being used, but Kosovars know it and would rather be used by US then abused by Serbia. Serbs on the other hand do not have a clue where Kostunica is leading them. They are turning into the dark spot of the future Europian political map. Russia's only interest in the region was to have one country left for them, Serbia was the logical and natural choice. If Russia would have really been interested in helping Serbia they would have never withdrawn their forces from Kosova, they would have actually stationed them in the North. A lot of work needs to be done by the Kosovar government in order to prevent the freezing of this problem and tackling this issue wiil require local and international diplomacy. I would suggest Vllasi and Surroi as the most fitted for the job.

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March 20, 2008
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