Lazy journalists, couch geopolitical strategists, and Cold War nostalgists have all been convinced that South Ossetia is like Kosovo. They are all convinced that the similarities are there; the only detail to square off remains which of one of the many combination of similarities has taken place in this case. But if there is any similarity - because connection there is none - between the two conflicts, Kosovo is like Georgia, not S. Ossetia.

Kosovo independence is an important point in the Russia-West record-keeping, but from the Kosovar perspective, the two issues couldn’t be further apart in some ways and very similar in surprising other ways, which will become apparent with time and the unveiling of Russia’s true intentions as it moves beyond the truce line into Georgia.

South Ossetia has held independence referendums in 1991 and 2006 with no consequences on the ground in either case. Kosovo too did hold a referendum in 1992 without diminishing the apartheid-like Serbian power on the ground. On the other hand, internationally coordinated and recognized independence of Kosovo in February 2008 came through no referendum. This clearly shows that what people on the ground wish for does not by itself make much of a difference at the end of the day. On the other hand, South Ossetia’s and Abkhazia’s real goal is to join Russia, while Kosovo has strictly ever requested independence, and a change to its borders inherited from Yugoslavia are prohibited by its constitution as a condition for this independence.

Other factual differences between the two situations are the minuscule population of South Ossetia with 70,000 people versus that of Kosovo with over 2 million. Even that minuscule, present-day Ossetian majority population is the result of demographic engineering. S. Ossetians are a result of the Stalinic settlement of the Soviet republics with Slavic population in order to diminish their autonomy and create a fifth column there. In Kosovo, Serbs were also settled with similar intentions, but the ethnic cleansing of around 850,000 Albanian Kosovars in 1998-1999 was reversed after the defeat of Serb forces. In 1992 S. Ossetians further ethnically cleansed about 200,000 of the local Georgian population and created their own Republika Srpska and then invited in the Russian Army to freeze the situation created, which Dayton did for Serbs in Bosnia barring the inability of Serbia to face NATO.

In the face of a major new conflict, Kosovo now falls under the radar. Until now, the threat of secessionism of these regions was a threat as long as it was potentially so, and Russia held that as a card on its hand. But technically, South Ossetia and its sister province of Abkhazia were as integrated in Russia as any Russian territory can be. Russia will actually lose out if it integrates these territories into itself because while further benefits are small, with its aggressiveness it damages heavily its international reputation and creates enemies among its other neighbors who would now be much more willing to looks towards NATO for protection of their sovereignty and natural resources.

Russia has no real interests in the Balkans, and especially not in Kosovo from where it voluntarily withdrew its poorly equipped paratroopers in 2004. For Russia, Kosovo is the joker card which it could use in situations where it could convert it to real value in its near abroad. Considering this, it is very likely that Serbs will be left out in the cold after any sort of deal between the West and Russia over the Georgian situation. Russia has so far used UN meetings to unleash its fury over Kosovo, and now it’s time to cash in on its international political credit.

The oxymoron of Russian peacekeepers in territories to the citizens of which Russia has extended citizenship, with regimes heavily backed by Moscow, in lands to which Russia has territorial ambitions has been shattered. Any sort of deal struck from now on will either bring in Russia as an official occupier of South Ossetia or bring in peacekeepers from outside the region depending on whose favor this war ends.

While some analysts have been saying that Russia is too important to the United States over the Iran issue, suddenly now Russia happens to become the other country entangled in sporadic fighting in an unstable region that is sure to drain its treasure, the lives of its young and ill prepared soldiers and its moral standing in the world. The United States might even be cheering over a situation similar to the Afghanistan-Vietnam analogy and Russia will soon be feeling United State’s pain on Iraq and Afghanistan. Russians will now get busy and unable to deal with other regions such as Kosovo, and this is good for Kosovo.

Those are the global implications of the two situations. But in the eyes of the Kosovars, as the Russian tanks roll towards Tbilisi, the parallels are more local. Georgia and Kosovo are both products of the disintegration of two superstates, USSR and Yugoslavia. Kosovo was a constitutional member of the Yugoslav superstate with the right to veto like other Yugoslav constitutional bodies; the provinces in the Caucasus were not.  In Kosovo as in Georgia, it’s the neighboring regional power and dominant resulting country of one superstate – Serbia - attempting to establish control of its smaller neighbors through sheer imbalance of military power, and when that fails as it did after the disintegration of USSR, falling back on just a part of that territory similar to Serbia maneuvering to hold to northern Kosovo today or Krajina in Croatia. This analogy was apparent to the Georgian president when even in the face of secessionist movements at home and a frenzied opposing Russia at the border, he declared to an Estonian radio station that Georgia would recognize Kosovo independence.

The parallels with the Georgia situation of the attempt of using an ethnic minority inside the country - Kosovo Serbs – to carve up a part of the country is not missing on Kosovars. Today it seems that European diplomats such as Carl Bildt have woken up to this realization, and are circling their wagons around Georgia. But it should be noted that their lackadaisical stance towards Russia during Kosovo independence process is partly to blame for giving Russia this new-found arrogance, and for ultimately letting Georgia fall under the destruction of the Russian bear.