When Russia joined Serbia in opposing the independence of Kosovo, the West did not like it, but when Moscow said that the recognition could create a precedent, this concern was considered a legitimate one. After all, the world is full of ethnic divisions, although most of them relatively dormant.

 

Therefore the West promised that this would be a unique case defined by two conditions: the long record of crimes against humanity committed by the Serbs during the last decade and Serbia's inability to integrate Kosovo back. Diplomats and high officials tried to convince Russia that the West was determined to reject any effort to use Kosovo as a precedent. Russia remained unconvinced.
 
Of course during those tense months of negotiations with Moscow no one in the West thought that despite all this talk about international law, Russia would be the first to use Kosovo as a precedent.
 
Why was Russia fighting so hard? If the West joined them and China against any effort to make Kosovo a precedent, who else could have been capable of challenging this decision? Who was Russia afraid from?
 
Well, apparently, Russia was afraid of itself. This can be the only conclusion given the recent Moscow's recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states. After lecturing the West and the rest of the world about the danger of Kosovo precedent, Russia became the first in history to use it as one.
 

Comparison with Kosovo is quite a long stretch

 
Russia's position is simple: if Kosovo has the right to become a state, why South Ossetia and Abkhazia don't? It is a question that some people have been asking in the West too (those who either have little knowledge about the two cases or have political or economic reasons to go against their current governments).
 
Georgia treatment of these two provinces is nothing to be proud of. However, this is not even near the mass graves filled with killed civilians that the Serbian army and aramilitary units left behind in Kosovo. It is enough to mention the 800 bodies that the Serbs took with them from Kosovo to Belgrade in a desperate effort to hide their crimes from history. These bodies were found later buried in three mass graves near the capital of Serbia. They were added to more than 10,000 civilians killed during the war in Kosovo, most of them ethnic Albanians.
 
Georgians may have never been serious about improving the life of the Ossetians and Abkhazians but they have never planned a forced mass exodus of their populations as the Serbs did and later executed in Kosovo.
 
The extent to which the Serbs have burned their bridges with the Kosovars is seen in the inability of the most moderate politicians in both sides to sit and agree with each other. Despite all these the West has insisted to the strong discontent of the Kosovars to offer only conditional independence to Kosovo. The new state will be under watch and its treatment of minorities, its relations with neighbors and its self-ruling efficiency will determine whether this independence will stand the test of time.
 
This is a far cry from the way the Russians have supported the full and undisputable independence of the two autonomous republics.
 
Leaving the principles and the moral issues aside and putting on the practical lens: an independent Kosovo is the only practical choice in the region. Kosovo is too big for Serbia to handle. Belgrade and the region cannot afford a long-term conflict. Kosovo in Serbia is not like Chechnya in Russia, a rebelling corner of the large federation. A more adequate comparison would be with Russia trying to get back a country four times the size of Ukraine.
 
While some can say that Abkhazia is not that small either compared to Georgia, it is worth pointing out that while Serbia has a population of around four times the population of Kosovo, Georgia has a population of 18 times the population of Abkhazia (of which at least 20% are Georgians and less than half ethnic Abkhazians). While it is not fair to  discriminate on the basis of population size, it is also worth noting that Kosovo with two million people is not the same with South Ossetia of 70 thousand.
 
Finally, what really matters is that Kosovo with its larger size and blessed with natural resources is a viable state while the two former Georgian provinces will be in the mercy of the Russian life-support and will practically join the federation de facto if not de jure.
 

A blow to Russia's image

 
By standing up to the West's recognition of Kosovo's independence Russia somehow became a champion to the countries that believe the creation of new states could one day endanger their own territorial integrity. Many of them care little for Serbia and few of them see a ractical connection between Kosovo's case and their own situation, but they consider it prudent to see this project fail.
 
However, with its decision to recognize both South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent republics, Russia is bound to become a strong delusion in the eyes of those who thought that its opposition to Kosovo's independence was based on principles. Furthermore, by keeping nchanged its position on Kosovo, Russia is seen as hypocritical by the rest of the  countries that recognized the self-determination right of Kosovo.
 
After carefully and craftily building a strong image in the world, Russia has rushed to taint it within a few weeks with military and political moves that could have been easily avoidable. For the first time in recent years, Russia has shown little confidence in its olitical clout in the international affairs.
 
Since the second week of August, many friends of Georgia throughout the world thought that Georgia fell into Russia's trap by responding with force to "South Ossetians' harassment". However, now is the time for the friends of Russia to scratch their heads and try to understand how Russia did this to itself.
 
Were those two provinces worth Russia's international image or a possible change in the Western position on Chechnya and other republics in the Dagestan area or elsewhere in the federation? Until now, Russia was in the comfortable international position of blaming the West for weakening the UN. Russia's yesterday decision reversed the situation.
 
Furthermore, to Serbia, which has placed much its trust and hope on Russia's support for their fight against Kosovo's independence, the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states is not good news. Now, Belgrade has to find a way to refuse Russia's nvitation to join it in its new unreasonable stance, which, as the foreign minister of Sweden said, is not anymore against the West, but against the entire international community.

 

Avxhiu is an editor for the weekly newspaper Illyria.