How can you know what issues are the most important for Kosovo? It is very easy. Read the newspapers and write down what they present as the most important topics. Then, watch the broadcast of the Assembly’s session when they announce the agenda. Cross out, from the most important headlines of the newspapers, the issues that were also included in the Assembly’s agenda for discussion. Whatever issues remain are the most important issues for Kosovo.
Kosovo is not a Democratic Republic because it does not have democracy. Kosovo is neither a Parliamentary Republic because it does not have parliamentarianism. Maybe Giorgio Agamben would have said that Kosovo
is a Governmental Republic, a Republic where the decrees of the
government turn into laws by the routine ratification of the Assembly?
Not really. It is even worse:Kosovo is a Republic in the hands of two
persons – the president and the prime minister. These two together make
up a teenager king who all the other kings in the world make fun of.
This is howKosovo comes across regarding the vital issues of a state, the issues of sovereignty and territorial integrity.
In order not to lose their positions, Fatmir Sejdiu and Hashim Thaçi initially opposed the six-point proposal of Ban Ki-Moon. This proposal was earlier Slobodan Samardzic’s plan for the “functional partition” of Kosovo, and recently became an agreement between the UN and Serbia. Sejdiu and Thaçi, concerned that they would not be able to survive politically inKosovo if accepting this proposal, opposed it. In the meetings with the internationals, it seemed that Sejdiu was louder than Thaçi in his opposition. This is very understandable for those who know these two a little bit. While Thaçi has a more powerful position in PDK, the position of Sejdiu in LDK is more fragile. Therefore, Sejdiu had to pretend to be a patriot and a principled man. Not only the resistance but also the intensity of the resistance resulted from their personal motives for authority. In this situation, where local politics has subordinated to international politics, the more fragile a politician (in his party), the stronger politician (for Kosovo).
However, how did Sejdiu and Thaçi come to the conclusion that if they now say Yes, they would irrevocably be jeopardized? I do not believe that this had to do with the situation that could be created on the ground after their acceptance. Before the declaration of independence,Kosovo ’s political leaders were invited to negotiations and at the end, they readily agreed to compromises that were unimaginable in the beginning. After the declaration of independence,Kosovo ’s leaders were not invited to negotiations, but were offered an agreement as if it was a done deal. They considered that being offered an agreement in this manner could be fatal for them. They considered that accepting an agreement offered this way - as a done deal rather than as a result of a negotiating process - would politically bury them. Marti Ahtisaari knew that his plan, which would come out of negotiations, would be no more than the report of Kai Eide, made more concrete and detailed according to the requests of Serbia. However, Ahtisaari led a process that lasted a year and a half to accomplish what in principle was known since the beginning. The long duration of the process enabled a step by step deceit of the public.
Ban Ki-Moon did not act like Marti Ahtisaari. After he received Sejdiu and Thaçi’s approval (“in principle”) of his 12 June letter, he did not involve them in further negotiations.Why did Ban offer something already prepared? Why did he not instead arrange for a process that would make Sejdiu and Thaçi look more dignified? Maybe Ban acted like this because Sejdiu and Thaçi were not really factors on the ground – they do not have an army, do not have control over the police, and they do not have any economic power. However, this is not a sufficient response. The reason why Ban Ki-Moon left Sejdiu and Thaçi outside the process for five months is that he did not expect them to accept new negotiations with Serbia at the time when the Constitution of the Republic ofKosovo was being approved. Only now, when they have refused the proposed six-point agreement, are ready to accept negotiations. Their present request for dialogue and ‘positive modifications’ is a demand for negotiations. In only five months, Belgrade, which continuously threatened with negotiations, has made Pristina demand negotiations!
If before the declaration of independence, negotiations preceded an agreement for compromise, now after the declaration of independence, it is the newest compromise agreement that is preceding negotiations. A careful reading of Ban Ki-moon’s points shows that further talks are foreseen for at least three of the points (customs, transportation and infrastructure and the cultural heritage). Therefore, the UN-Serbia six-point agreement, besides being an agreement, is also an agreement for new negotiations that will lead to new agreements and maybe to new negotiations…Something like Spinoza’s idea-ideae doctrine of infinite regress. The four-point plan of Sejdiu and Thaçi is not a plan (for Kosovo ) but a standpoint (for the international authorities). It is the initial position for upcoming negotiations. Sejdiu and Thaçi do not make plans because they do not want to implement them. Implementing plans means taking the state mechanisms to implement the plans. They express standpoints and with these they become part of the bargain for Kosovo where they remain elevated while Kosovo sinks.
What is maintaining this continuous degradation of our political position? Ban Ki-Moon’s six points do not present new topics compared to the Ahtisaari Plan. Serbia wants more quantitatively, not qualitatively. Serbia has already gained the quality it wants with the Ahtisaari Plan. So the essential difference is not between the Ahtisaari Plan and the six points but between a normal state and a state with the Ahtisaari Plan. The division of Kosovo was cemented in the Ahtisaari Plan. The Ahtisaari Plan ethnically divided the police and judicial system, and Serbianized the cultural heritage of medieval era. Based on that plan, Serbs has gained the opportunity to block Kosovo’s institutions with the right of the veto, the ISR/EUSR has become king of Kosovo , the territory is divided and the united character of the institutions is demolished. Only a bought or ignorant political leadership could cripple the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of Kosovo before it was actually granted. Every EU state that would have implemented the Ahtisaari Plan would have disintegrated completely. Kosovo, due to this plan, will not even manage to become a real state. Kosovo ’s official political elite gave up the substance of the state in Vienna. They made concessions previously unheard of. And now of course, this elite is expected to make new concessions. The West cannot understand how Sejdiu and Thaçi can resist today, when yesterday they made greater concessions and Kosovo has not gained strength as a state in the meantime, with an army, or economic development. Those who have made essential concessions and still have not gained strength, can always be relied on to make some more, right?
In order not to lose their positions, Fatmir Sejdiu and Hashim Thaçi initially opposed the six-point proposal of Ban Ki-Moon. This proposal was earlier Slobodan Samardzic’s plan for the “functional partition” of Kosovo, and recently became an agreement between the UN and Serbia. Sejdiu and Thaçi, concerned that they would not be able to survive politically inKosovo if accepting this proposal, opposed it. In the meetings with the internationals, it seemed that Sejdiu was louder than Thaçi in his opposition. This is very understandable for those who know these two a little bit. While Thaçi has a more powerful position in PDK, the position of Sejdiu in LDK is more fragile. Therefore, Sejdiu had to pretend to be a patriot and a principled man. Not only the resistance but also the intensity of the resistance resulted from their personal motives for authority. In this situation, where local politics has subordinated to international politics, the more fragile a politician (in his party), the stronger politician (for Kosovo).
However, how did Sejdiu and Thaçi come to the conclusion that if they now say Yes, they would irrevocably be jeopardized? I do not believe that this had to do with the situation that could be created on the ground after their acceptance. Before the declaration of independence,Kosovo ’s political leaders were invited to negotiations and at the end, they readily agreed to compromises that were unimaginable in the beginning. After the declaration of independence,Kosovo ’s leaders were not invited to negotiations, but were offered an agreement as if it was a done deal. They considered that being offered an agreement in this manner could be fatal for them. They considered that accepting an agreement offered this way - as a done deal rather than as a result of a negotiating process - would politically bury them. Marti Ahtisaari knew that his plan, which would come out of negotiations, would be no more than the report of Kai Eide, made more concrete and detailed according to the requests of Serbia. However, Ahtisaari led a process that lasted a year and a half to accomplish what in principle was known since the beginning. The long duration of the process enabled a step by step deceit of the public.
Ban Ki-Moon did not act like Marti Ahtisaari. After he received Sejdiu and Thaçi’s approval (“in principle”) of his 12 June letter, he did not involve them in further negotiations.Why did Ban offer something already prepared? Why did he not instead arrange for a process that would make Sejdiu and Thaçi look more dignified? Maybe Ban acted like this because Sejdiu and Thaçi were not really factors on the ground – they do not have an army, do not have control over the police, and they do not have any economic power. However, this is not a sufficient response. The reason why Ban Ki-Moon left Sejdiu and Thaçi outside the process for five months is that he did not expect them to accept new negotiations with Serbia at the time when the Constitution of the Republic ofKosovo was being approved. Only now, when they have refused the proposed six-point agreement, are ready to accept negotiations. Their present request for dialogue and ‘positive modifications’ is a demand for negotiations. In only five months, Belgrade, which continuously threatened with negotiations, has made Pristina demand negotiations!
If before the declaration of independence, negotiations preceded an agreement for compromise, now after the declaration of independence, it is the newest compromise agreement that is preceding negotiations. A careful reading of Ban Ki-moon’s points shows that further talks are foreseen for at least three of the points (customs, transportation and infrastructure and the cultural heritage). Therefore, the UN-Serbia six-point agreement, besides being an agreement, is also an agreement for new negotiations that will lead to new agreements and maybe to new negotiations…Something like Spinoza’s idea-ideae doctrine of infinite regress. The four-point plan of Sejdiu and Thaçi is not a plan (for Kosovo ) but a standpoint (for the international authorities). It is the initial position for upcoming negotiations. Sejdiu and Thaçi do not make plans because they do not want to implement them. Implementing plans means taking the state mechanisms to implement the plans. They express standpoints and with these they become part of the bargain for Kosovo where they remain elevated while Kosovo sinks.
What is maintaining this continuous degradation of our political position? Ban Ki-Moon’s six points do not present new topics compared to the Ahtisaari Plan. Serbia wants more quantitatively, not qualitatively. Serbia has already gained the quality it wants with the Ahtisaari Plan. So the essential difference is not between the Ahtisaari Plan and the six points but between a normal state and a state with the Ahtisaari Plan. The division of Kosovo was cemented in the Ahtisaari Plan. The Ahtisaari Plan ethnically divided the police and judicial system, and Serbianized the cultural heritage of medieval era. Based on that plan, Serbs has gained the opportunity to block Kosovo’s institutions with the right of the veto, the ISR/EUSR has become king of Kosovo , the territory is divided and the united character of the institutions is demolished. Only a bought or ignorant political leadership could cripple the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of Kosovo before it was actually granted. Every EU state that would have implemented the Ahtisaari Plan would have disintegrated completely. Kosovo, due to this plan, will not even manage to become a real state. Kosovo ’s official political elite gave up the substance of the state in Vienna. They made concessions previously unheard of. And now of course, this elite is expected to make new concessions. The West cannot understand how Sejdiu and Thaçi can resist today, when yesterday they made greater concessions and Kosovo has not gained strength as a state in the meantime, with an army, or economic development. Those who have made essential concessions and still have not gained strength, can always be relied on to make some more, right?
Albin Kurti leads the Vetevendosje! Movement.
Comments (5)
user
said:
|
... I don't think it can get any tougher for the people living in Kosove. Nevertheless, things can only get better...think back to the past when Serbia had ruled over our land. Never again. |
|
to_uk
said:
|
... This is a great article and Albin is the most underated analysit/politican/patriot today, this is spot on what he is saying its got nothing to do with pesimism, but the reality is that we are in deep sh*t and we are going to sink if we dont change them then good luck to those who live in Kosova, cos tuough times are coming ahead. |
|
BESIM
said:
|
... I must say that Albin is right and the fact that a full independant state of Kosova is not in a near future; not with these terms and conditions. We got fooled by our allies, not comletely but 75-25. Will we take this and shut up, or will there be something coming up on the Albanians around Kosova such as Lugina dhe Shkupi deri nStrugë. Well it's easy: We have done it before and will do it agian. This calls for Unification. |
|
behar
said:
|
... Too pessimistic for my liking. No one has the monopoly of the truth and it is too early to portray Kosovo as the losers and Serbia as the winner. Full independence is going to take some time yet. Kosovo has had five elections since 1999, so to call it undemocratic is harsh, it has had the fairest elections in the region also. Nevertheless, the article makes some good points, like the fact that Kosovo needs to build up its army and economy so future leaders can have more leverage in the international community. |
|
Write comment









