Although Kosovo’s independence has been recognized by the United States, it lacks genuine sovereignty.  With five entities competing for power, Kosovo is drifting.

Since Kosovo declared its independence on February 17, 2008, it has been recognized by 52 countries; it has a constitution with a majority of laws based on the criteria outlined in the Ahtisaari plan; it has its own multiethnic flag and national anthem; it has established its foreign ministry; it has prepared new passports; and it is currently in the process of establishing security forces with the assistance of NATO experts.

Nevertheless, it is hard to envision how Kosovo is to achievefull economic and political independence with five entities competingfor power and reporting to their own chains of command. The UnitedNations, which should have handed over its mission to the EuropeanUnion on June 15, became increasingly reluctant to pass on its mandatein the face of Russian pressure, invoking UN Resolution 1244, and theobjection of Serbia and seven EU members.  On June 12, UN GeneralSecretary Ban Ki-moon sent a letter to Kosovo President Fatmir Sejdiuand Serbian President Boris Tadic, stating that he wanted to“reconfigure UNMIK” and “to place the EU under it.”  EULEX, the2,200-member body led by General Yves de Kermabon that is supposed tosupervise the police and the judiciary, has yet to fill its ranks(there are only 300 in country) and deploy to the north. TheInternational Civilian Office (ICO), the 1,800-strong administrativebody led by Peter Feith, reports to a steering group of representativepowers, and individual members actually report to their individual homecountries. KFOR reports to NATO command, and the troops participatingin the Kosovo mission report to their home countries.

Then there is the Kosovo government and parliament, which isbeing cautioned by the international community to remain patient andwhich, under the new constitution, must respect the power of the ICO to“sanction and remove any public official and annul any decision orlegislation that violates the letter or spirit of the settlement.”  Andfinally, there are the Kosovo Serbs, who are being manipulated by Belgrade to refuse integration into the new state of Kosovo. 

The alphabet soup of “internationals” seems to lack a clear plan for solving the serious political and economic problems that Kosovofaces.  In addition, the ICO, the new lead body, is now in competitionwith UNMIK. This makes it highly unlikely for decision making tocoalesce and that any robust response will be made to Serbia’s effortsto undermine the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Kosovo.  Until this changes, Kosovo will be independent in name only.

Serbia, with the backing of Russia, is working to undermine Kosovo’s sovereignty and to destabilize the region.  The United States must again stand up to both.

Serbia has not accepted independence, international supervision, or theAhtisaari principles.  Through its intensive lobbying effortschallenging Kosovo’s sovereignty, there has been a slowdown in the recognition of Kosovo as a new state.  Serbia is simultaneously changing the realities on the ground.  They are using money to control Kosovo Serbs, 40 percent of whom live above the Ibar River in northern Kosovo and 60 percent of whom live below in enclaves throughout Kosovo.  Since the declaration of independence, Belgrade has strengthenedparallel structures, including police, judiciary, border control,transportation, telecommunications, and cultural heritage sites. OnFebruary 20, Kosovo Serbs, with support from Belgrade, blew up two border crossings in northern Kosovo, Gates 1 and 31, and the border checkpoints of Brnjak, Jarinje, andMutivode.  Last month, on June 28, they established a parliament in thenorth.

Tom Yazdgerdi, political and economic section chief of the U.S.Embassy, with whom we had an excellent meeting, told us that the UnitedStates is sending a clear message to Belgrade that it cannot embracethe European Union and its future admittance to it and at the same timeobject to EULEX and maintain control over Kosovo Serbs. (More than any other Western factor, the United States is pressing Serbia to accept the independence of Kosovoand to get on with its own democratization.)  As a lawyer working forthe international community stated, “There will be a full blownpolitical crisis in the European Union if Tadic pursues both tracks.”

Nevertheless, Serbian cooperation of any sort is highly unlikely whilethe Serbs feel that they have Russian backing. Very few want to jointhe European Union—most have the right to travel anyway–and certainlynot if it means “losing Kosovo,” as they see it.  Russia, calling theindependence of Kosovo“illegal,” continues to invoke UN Resolution 1244, even though 1244neither allows nor disallows independence.  Nevertheless, if 1244 isnot removed, Serbian parallel structures will get concretized.  TheUnited States must again stand up to Russia.  As has historically beenthe case, until the United States does so, the European Union willremain divided and Kosovo ’s status will not be resolved once and forall.  With 25 percent of the financial responsibility for EULEX and atroop presence in Camp Bondsteel, the United States cannot afford totake a back seat to Europe at this critical juncture.

The de facto partition of Mitrovice is a reality.  The Kosovo government and internationals have not yet been able to take the north under their control, partly because most of the West is once again appeasing Serbia.

The north of Kosovo, beginning with Mitrovica, has effectivelyseparated itself with Serbian support, and is utterly lawless. Serbia’s end game has always been the partition of the north.  Ahigh-ranking member of the ICO told us that EULEX will eventuallydeploy, but the timing remains to be seen because of concerns about EUforces coming under attack.  As Tom Yazdgerdi rightly told us, “IfEULEX does not deploy into the north, we will have problems.”  But itremains to be seen if the ICO and EULEX have any idea about how toregain control of the north other than by waiting and hoping thatTadic’s government’s desire to join the EU will yield greatercooperation from the Serbs.  The UN and the Contact Group member alsoseem to be taking this wait and see approach. The result is thatBelgrade is seizing the opportunity to fulfill its territorialambitions, continuing Slobodan Milosevic’s quest for “Greater Serbia.”

As a USAID representative told us off the record, “efforts should bemade to gain control over the Serb majority in the south by giving themcarrots, while giving Belgrade the stick by challenging the lawless ofthe north on a daily basis and publicly bringing attention toBelgrade’s intransigence in the international media.” 

Without intervention by the United States to accelerate the deploymentof EULEX in the north, with support from KFOR, the partition willbecome a reality, and this will open the way for renewed discussion ofmaking the Presheva Valley a part of Kosovo, as it was before the Serbs illegally annexed it in 1956.  We met withleaders from several political parties and NGOs in Presheva, Medvedgje,and Bujanoc in Gjilan and received a chilling portrait of theapartheid-like conditions for Albanians there.  The Serbian police andmilitary are engaged in a silent ethnic cleansing in the PreshevaValley. They are deliberately using violent and oppressive tactics inan attempt to drive the Albanian people out of the region, whilesimultaneously blocking refugee returns.  The problems of Albanians inthe Presheva Valley amount to the worst human rights situation inEurope.

The economy is negatively impacted by Kosovo’s lack of sovereignty and the lack of a steady supply of energy.  Unaddressed, this will pave the way for a social crisis. 

As Muhamet Mustafa, the president of RIINVEST Institute for Development Research, emphasized, until Kosovocan control its territory, there will be no fair competition.  Severalbusinessmen that we interviewed supported this statement and said thatno one is taking action to deal with the Serbs.  The porous borders inthe north have meant that there are no duties and taxes on Serbianimports, while Albanian businessmen and women are paying these fees. As a result, the new Kosovar state is likely to be rapidly bankruptedby tax free goods, including gasoline, smuggled in from Serbia, unlessimmediate steps are taken to introduce checkpoints throughout thecountry.  Laws must be enforced across the board.  Right now there isno way to introduce economic rules in the Serb enclaves.  For example, Kosovar Serbs are driving cars with licenses from the Yugoslav era and refusing to register with the Kosovo government, and no one takes action against them.

Riinvest staffers, Kosovo political officials, and the U.S.Embassy all stressed the inability to attract economic investment inthe absence of a reliable supply of energy. Riinvest stressed the factthat the country cannot wait for the extension of its lignite-miningoperations and the building of the new high-capacity power plant knownas “Kosovo C.”  In the short run, they recommend installing new capacity at Kosovo B and building new, smaller (1,000 megawatts) plants throughout the country.
 
Kosovars still depend on expatriate earnings being remitted and ondonor funds.  But with the deteriorating world economic situation,remittances are half of what they were after the war and most Europeancountries are sharply tightening controls on legal and illegalimmigration.  The July 11 donor conference in Brussels brought 1.2billion euros of assistance to Kosovo, but a large part of the totalwill go to serving Kosovo’s share of the Yugoslav debt that itinherited from Serbia on independence.  Meanwhile, at least 50 percentof the population is unemployed and 30,000 students graduate and enterthe job market each year, but only 3,000, according to Riinvest, findjobs.  The black economy is growing and corruption is increasing. Unless change comes soon, the potential for widespread social unrest isreal.

The Kosovo government is bowing to the international community, when it should be pursuing internal solutions.

The present Kosovo Government appears to be principally concerned withholding on to power.  It has yet to put forth a proactive strategy forsolving the country’s problems and is not moving energetically andsystematically in areas where it can exercise power (i.e., obtainingrecognition through active lobbying).  In some political circles, thereis an air of self satisfaction (“we can sit back now that we haveindependence”).  In others, the atmosphere is one of dispiritedparalysis (“only the internationals can solve this”), when in realitythe international community has little idea of how to move forwards,and, in some sectors, is actually encouraging drift.  The only way thatKosovo can succeed is if its government and its people take charge.Otherwise, it will be permanently dependent on the internationaladministration.  As former Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj said, “Weneed local solutions with international assistance.” 

Until the international community is willing to establish a properly independent Kosovo state, stability in Southeast Europe will be at risk.

Serbia has been able to slow the process of recognition of Kosovo withthe abiding help of Russia.  Through vigorous diplomatic actions in theinternational arena, on the one hand, and by consolidating politicaland economic control over the Serb community in Kosovo, on the other,Belgrade is working to weaken Kosovo’s February 2008 declaration ofindependence.  On a daily basis it is raising questions in diplomaticcircles and in the press about whether Kosovo is capable of functioningas a sovereign, multiethnic state.  Belgrade has been helped, to agreat extent, by the fact that the international community wasunwilling to establish Kosovo as a properly independent state. 

Much has been made of the Ahtisaari plan as the key to Kosovo’sindependence.  While it established the basis for recognition, itsoperation at a technical level (building a functioning society) dependsfor its workability on Serbian agreement and cooperation, none of whichis forthcoming.  Several commentators told us that, in the absence ofcooperation from Belgrade and Kosovo Serbs, the Ahtisaari plan shouldbe regarded as null and void and replaced with a system in which thereis one vote for each of Kosovo’s citizens, equal protection for all,and with no special privileges on the basis of ethnicity.  No matterwhat decision is made about Ahtisaari, it is clear that theinternational community and Kosovo need a plan that genuinely protectsand consolidates the achievements of Kosovo and prevents anypartitioning of the north and internal separation across ethnic lines.

Shirley Cloyes DioGuardi is Balkan Affairs Adviser to the Albanian American Civic League