This week, the Government published a report evaluating its achievements for 2008 which blindly refuses to acknowledge the crisis in which Kosovo finds itself almost one year after the Declaration of Independence. Laying asphalted roads and building new schools are positive developments, but they are devalued of all meaning by a political and economic context shaped by the absence of sovereignty and independence.
The Kosovo Government and Assembly have not been helpless in preventing
this crisis over our sovereignty and territorial integrity. They
approved a Declaration of Independence which states that Kosovo will
act in accordance with Resolution 1244, even though this Resolution
recognizes the territorial integrity and sovereignty of former
Yugoslavia, now Serbia, over Kosovo. The declaration also included a
commitment to the Ahtisaari Plan, even though Serbia was not going to
recognize Kosovo. Finally, it invited and welcomed ‘an international
presence’ (now both UNMIK and EULEX) to operate in Kosovo on the basis
of Resolution 1244, the ICO to supervise the implementation of the
Ahtisaari Plan and an EU rule of law mission (EULEX). It did not invite
these missions as equal partners in order to monitor, but granted them
executive powers.
The contents of this Declaration unraveled the positive elements in external recognition. It made it possible for Kosovo to be subject to the executive powers of EULEX, which does not recognize Kosovo’s independence; to be subject to the ICO, which is supervising the implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan, which divides Kosovo territorially and ethnically; and finally it made possible UNMIK’s continuing role in mediating the details of the Six Points, which so far, divide Kosovo institutionally and ethnically.
Stemming from this Declaration, the Constitution which should be the highest legal document in the country became based upon and secondary in law to the Ahtisaari Plan. In addition, the government and assembly, instead of deriving their authority from the people and being accountable to the people, were made accountable to and dependent for their authority on the ICR and EULEX. Serbia’s capacity to extend its control inside Kosovo was thus increased, while the capacity of Kosovo’s institutions to prevent this extension was limited, as they made themselves subject to international missions, which are guided by their own interests, rather than the interests of Kosovo.
Despite tying its own hands inside this structure of dependency, the government has had windows of opportunity to act. But it has not. It has taken no measures to extend the authority of Kosovo’s institutions in the north of Kosovo, despite the confusion resulting from the struggle between the UN and EU over the EULEX mission for most of 2008. It has fallen in with the international rhetoric of ‘tolerance’ as the only necessary solution for the north. This rhetoric presumes that violence is a result of inter-ethnic tensions and not the direct result of Serbia’s policies in Kosovo. Consequently, the Government has not pushed the EU and US to sanction Serbia over its behavior in Kosovo. Finally because our politicians were willing to compromise Kosovo’s sovereignty and independence at the start of negotiations, they are ready to compromise again. They have not rejected the Ahtisaari Plan, even though Serbia has not recognized Kosovo. Finally, the government is standing by as the Six Points are implemented inside Kosovo. Kosovo’s government has become a spectator to the ethnic institutional and territorial partition of Kosovo.
The contents of this Declaration unraveled the positive elements in external recognition. It made it possible for Kosovo to be subject to the executive powers of EULEX, which does not recognize Kosovo’s independence; to be subject to the ICO, which is supervising the implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan, which divides Kosovo territorially and ethnically; and finally it made possible UNMIK’s continuing role in mediating the details of the Six Points, which so far, divide Kosovo institutionally and ethnically.
Stemming from this Declaration, the Constitution which should be the highest legal document in the country became based upon and secondary in law to the Ahtisaari Plan. In addition, the government and assembly, instead of deriving their authority from the people and being accountable to the people, were made accountable to and dependent for their authority on the ICR and EULEX. Serbia’s capacity to extend its control inside Kosovo was thus increased, while the capacity of Kosovo’s institutions to prevent this extension was limited, as they made themselves subject to international missions, which are guided by their own interests, rather than the interests of Kosovo.
Despite tying its own hands inside this structure of dependency, the government has had windows of opportunity to act. But it has not. It has taken no measures to extend the authority of Kosovo’s institutions in the north of Kosovo, despite the confusion resulting from the struggle between the UN and EU over the EULEX mission for most of 2008. It has fallen in with the international rhetoric of ‘tolerance’ as the only necessary solution for the north. This rhetoric presumes that violence is a result of inter-ethnic tensions and not the direct result of Serbia’s policies in Kosovo. Consequently, the Government has not pushed the EU and US to sanction Serbia over its behavior in Kosovo. Finally because our politicians were willing to compromise Kosovo’s sovereignty and independence at the start of negotiations, they are ready to compromise again. They have not rejected the Ahtisaari Plan, even though Serbia has not recognized Kosovo. Finally, the government is standing by as the Six Points are implemented inside Kosovo. Kosovo’s government has become a spectator to the ethnic institutional and territorial partition of Kosovo.
An excerpt from, "The Perfect Debate", by Shqiptar Oseku
Arguing against the Government’s obsession with recognition, Shqiptar Oseku wrote,
“If I were close to them, I would advise them to consult the leaders of the Palestinian state. It was declared in 1988, has been recognized by dozens of countries, has an observer status in the UN, is a full member of the Arab League, and takes part in Olympic Games. Or perhaps with the officials of Western Sahara, which has been recognized en block by the African Union, has diplomatic ties with 80 other countries, and has 13 foreign embassies. In this way, they will realize how much international recognition is worth when the situation on the ground is a mess. And, when they have done with them, they should go to the tiny Taiwan, which is recognized by only 23 insignificant countries, but sells missile technology to the United States.
I would advise them to stop the vain waltz of recognitions and roll up their sleeves to clean out the garbage that is signified by three Es -- enclaves, EULEX, and economy. Sovereignty -- territorial, political, and economic -- is the road to salvation, not the number of countries that have recognized us.”
“If I were close to them, I would advise them to consult the leaders of the Palestinian state. It was declared in 1988, has been recognized by dozens of countries, has an observer status in the UN, is a full member of the Arab League, and takes part in Olympic Games. Or perhaps with the officials of Western Sahara, which has been recognized en block by the African Union, has diplomatic ties with 80 other countries, and has 13 foreign embassies. In this way, they will realize how much international recognition is worth when the situation on the ground is a mess. And, when they have done with them, they should go to the tiny Taiwan, which is recognized by only 23 insignificant countries, but sells missile technology to the United States.
I would advise them to stop the vain waltz of recognitions and roll up their sleeves to clean out the garbage that is signified by three Es -- enclaves, EULEX, and economy. Sovereignty -- territorial, political, and economic -- is the road to salvation, not the number of countries that have recognized us.”
Vetevendosje! opposes international administration of Kosovo.
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